In an era marked by a sharp economic U-turn by the United States, from its traditional role as a global hegemon shaping the post-Second World War order and promoting trade liberalisation to the active endorsement of protectionist trade policies, global economic uncertainty has intensified.
As President Donald Trump remarked earlier this year, “I always say tariffs is the most beautiful word to me in the dictionary.” This statement reflects a broader return to protectionism, particularly under the renewed US tariff regime during Trump’s second term.
Amid this shift and the ongoing restructuring of the post-war international order under President Trump’s America First doctrine, it is undeniable that this policy has stimulated a global desire for an alternative to the so-called Western-centric international order.
This includes the energised expansion of an association of five major emerging economies, namely Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, collectively known as BRICS and its growing leadership role among Global South countries.
Thailand is currently negotiating with the United States for a 36% reduction in tariffs, following the recent unsuccessful attempt by “Team Thailand” during their trade negotiations trip to the US.
These efforts take place amid the country’s uncertain political future, with instability in the Pheu Thai Party-led coalition and the suspension of Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra from her duties , with the possibility of her removal from office by the Thai Constitutional Court.
In contrast, India is on the rise as the world’s most populous country, and the strong relationship between President Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi has placed India in a more favourable position.
However, India may still be affected by the recently proposed ‘secondary tariffs’—a trade enforcement mechanism similar to secondary sanctions, designed to penalise third-party countries or entities that maintain significant trade ties with a US-sanctioned state such as Russia.
This policy aims to escalate pressure on Moscow should there be no progress in resolving the war in Ukraine.
Nevertheless, both Thailand, India, and other BRICS-aligned countries have faced the threat of additional tariffs if they are perceived to challenge US geopolitical influence or the hegemonic role of the US dollar, an approach signalled by President Trump’s assertive “America First” doctrine.
This raises an important question: Can Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s decade-old Act East Policy help mitigate the adverse effects of growing global economic uncertainty for Thailand and India’s ASEAN partners amid a resurgence of US protectionism?
Thailand’s growing engagement with BRICS, since becoming a "Partner Country” of BRICS on 1 January 2025, comes amid continued chaotic democratic development following the 2014 coup and long-standing political polarisation involving Thaksin Shinawatra, who recently returned after 17 years in self-imposed exile and, recently began referring to himself as Thailand’s self-appointed ‘National Clerk’, and his political movement, in the aftermath of the suspension of his daughter from her position as Prime Minister and ongoing legal cases against her.
Despite persistent uncertainty, Thailand has begun to assert itself as a regional donor, particularly in mainland Southeast Asia, where the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation has played an active role for over two decades in Thailand’s eastern neighbouring countries, Lao PDR and Cambodia, with Cambodia currently reassessing its ongoing border conflict with Thailand through the lens of the complex relations between the Hun and Shinawatra families.
In this context, a critical question arises: can Thailand and India collaborate effectively within the BRICS+ framework to mitigate the negative impacts of renewed US protectionism?
As both continental and maritime neighbours, Thailand and India are already strategic partners in several regional and sub-regional frameworks. These include ASEAN, the East Asia Summit (EAS), the Ayeyawady–Chao Phraya–Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS), Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC), BIMSTEC, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), and the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT).
Through these platforms, the two nations work closely to address regional and sub-regional challenges.
BRICS now offers an additional avenue for synergy, with the potential to help shape a more democratic, multipolar world order grounded in mutual respect, shared objectives, and strengthened relations among Global South countries.
Since its founding in 2009, BRICS has grown into a significant player on the global geopolitical stage. The recently concluded 17th Summit in Rio de Janeiro (6–7 July 2025) demonstrated the determination of the 11 full members, including the newest, Indonesia, 10 partner countries, eight invited states, and seven international organisations to accelerate institutional reforms, particularly in climate finance and the ethical governance of artificial intelligence.
Thailand’s rationale for deepening engagement with India within BRICS is based on several converging interests. While these motivations may lean more towards economic imperatives than political alignment, they must be understood in context.
First, India’s rising global stature and integration into BRICS-led supply chains make it an attractive partner for diversifying Thailand’s trade and investment relationships. India’s advances in emerging technologies such as quantum computing and robotics offer further opportunities for strategic cooperation.
Second, Thailand needs to mitigate against potential fallout from an increasingly protectionist US, particularly under the prospect of a second Trump administration.
With global concern mounting over the implementation of secondary tariffs and the possibility of 36% duties on Thai exports looming, expanding trade with countries such as Brazil, India, the UAE, and other emerging economies in West Asia and Africa has become a strategic imperative.
Although India–US relations have strengthened in recent years, India may also face tariff-related challenges. Strengthening bilateral trade and investment ties is therefore crucial—especially for Thailand, which is grappling with sluggish domestic demand and slow economic growth.
Third, India is set to host the next BRICS Summit in 2026. As strategic partners with over seven decades of diplomatic relations grounded in shared civilisational values, most notably Hinduism and Buddhism, India and Thailand continue to deepen engagement across culture, commerce, defence, and regional security.
India’s leadership in climate action, having met its Paris Agreement commitments and targeting net-zero emissions by 2070, complements Thailand’s newly revised Power Development Plan (PDP 2024), which aims for renewable energy to constitute 50% of the country’s power generation by 2050.
India can provide both green investments and technical expertise to support Thailand’s transition to cleaner energy.
Finally, India’s leadership within BRICS, exemplified by initiatives such as the BRICS Vaccine R&D Centre launched in 2022, underscores its commitment to South–South cooperation.
This centre offers vital assurance that future pandemics need not be as devastating as COVID-19.
India’s global prominence in vaccine production, pharmaceuticals, and wellness tourism positions it as a key partner for Thailand and the wider BRICS community.
The deepening of Thailand–India cooperation within the BRICS+ framework holds strategic potential not only for enhancing economic resilience amid rising global protectionism, but also for contributing to a more inclusive and multipolar international order.
While China and Russia openly challenge Western hegemony, India’s vision of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam—“the world is one family”, offers a more conciliatory and cooperative model.
This ethos resonates with many nations seeking peace, shared prosperity, and equitable partnership, as reflected in Prime Minister Modi’s guiding principle: “Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas” or “striving together for inclusive growth.”
However, how Thailand can adapt its so-called ‘bamboo diplomacy’, the art of maintaining flexibility and balancing relations with all major powers, being “friend to all, enemy to none, remains a pressing challenge.
For the United States, trade negotiations are rarely about trade alone; they are often intertwined with democratic values, human rights, and regional security.
Thailand’s recent deportation of Uyghur refugees has drawn strong criticism from Washington, undermining its credibility in the eyes of Western allies and highlighting the limits of its strategic pragmatism.
In contrast, during his 2023 address to a joint session of the U.S. Congress, Prime Minister Narendra Modi described India as “the mother of democracy,” reinforcing a shared democratic identity by noting that “America is the oldest and India is the largest democracy.”
For Thailand, this highlights that conforming to democratic norms is not merely a moral stance, but a necessary strategic position, one that can help ensure its engagement with BRICS+ enhances rather than undermines its broader international interests.
Dr. Titipol Phakdeewanich is a political scientist at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University, Thailand and Prof. Reena Marwah is the author of Reimagining India–Thailand Relations: A Multilateral and Bilateral Perspective (World Scientific, Singapore, 2020). She is former Professor of International Business at the University of Delhi and currently serves as Secretary General of the Association of Asia Scholars, India.
