Arguably and ironically, the “minority” prime minister may want to dissolve the House of Representatives today, while his opponents may want him to last as long as possible or at least honour the “four months” promise by not doing anything sooner.
Anutin Charnvirakul is gaining a major political advantage from the dispute with Cambodia, and the agreed short term is making him be like an office worker who is leaving in just a few months. That employee, if he or she misses the job already and wants to make a lasting impression, will work like crazy.
In addition to that, four months is too short for his image to be significantly spoiled. And he is being helped in no small measure by the revival of the Half-Half economic stimulation scheme that Thais like.
On the other hand, Pheu Thai needs time to regroup, and the People’s Party wants the border situation to improve drastically before the new election, which does not seem to be the case at the moment.
These situations of the three main political players mean that Thailand is now in a peculiar state of affairs where government rivals probably do not want a House dissolution as much as the ruling party. It also means that if Anutin faces a censure, he wouldn’t mind dissolving the House earlier than agreed.
But who will be tempted to launch a no-confidence offensive? It could be a political suicide if the People’s Party does it. Pheu Thai is making all the noises and looking likelier to initiate the attack, but it is not holding the trump card.
Like Pheu Thai, the People’s Party is not benefiting from the border affair. But unlike Pheu Thai, the People’s Party will look really bad if it censures a government it gave birth to.
Yet while Pheu Thai is both constitutionally and politically entitled to a censure, a no-confidence debate against Anutin may never happen. A censure loss would create all sorts of problems for him and hence he would rather choose to snip it in the bud.
In other words, Anutin, several analysts have started to believe, will dissolve the House at the first sniff of censure troubles. By calling a snap election very early, he would have put Pheu Thai in a major disadvantage. For starters, the opposition party has not come up with prime ministerial candidates who could be embraced by voters.
Pheu Thai has been threatening to defeat Anutin at censure, which, if happening, will affect the People’s Party greatly too. The latter party has voted Anutin into office, so supporting him at the no-confidence forum could add to the doubts and wipe away much of the support that made it the winner of the 2023 election.
If the censure happens, the People’s Party will have to vote against Anutin. A pro-Anutin vote would add to the lengthening list of laughable political ironies besetting Thailand. (If
Anutin survives thanks to an opposition party that wants him to remain to just dissolve the House of Representatives a little later anyway, it will be extraordinarily ironic even by the Thai standards.)
The People’s Party relies on sentiment, not well-built rural mechanisms like old-school political parties. This means it can win a landslide when perceptions go its way, and it can hit a brick wall when they don’t.
Therefore, if Pheu Thai plans to initiate a censure and Anutin dissolves the House to preempt it, it can be three birds with only one stone. Firstly, he can nullify the censure motion. Secondly, he can make Pheu Thai compete in the next election in continued disarray. Thirdly, he can enter the election with his biggest rival, the People’s Party, not entirely popular.
There may be the fourth bird killed still. “Lesser” election competitors like Palang Pracharath, United Thai Nation and the Democrats are fractured, so the more time for electoral preparations the better. A very-early snap election will take away what they want the most.
The key is that he has to dissolve the House before a censure motion is officially submitted and accepted, or he will not be able to do it at all. This is why the possibility of Anutin’s “preemptive strike” will be in proportion to his suspicion.
In other words, the more he suspects that Pheu Thai is up to something, the greater the chance he will dissolve the House.
A lot of things are telling Anutin that if his current reign has to be short, he will still have a great shot. Bhumjaithai wants to cement its superiority over the Democrats and surpass Pheu Thai as the second biggest party. Such ambitions are realistic.
Pheu Thai will have to come up with very attractive prime ministerial nominees. The name of Suriya Juangroongruangkit has been mooted, and so has a son-in-law of Thaksin Shinawatra, young business tycoon Nutthaphong Kunakornwong.
Suriya is an unexciting veteran whereas Nutthaphong, husband of Thaksin’s daughter Pintongta, might not be as appealing to the young generation as when Pheu Thai’s rating was higher.
There is a scenario, though, in which Anutin’s party coming second or a proud third does not mean anything. In this scenario, the People’s Party and Pheu Thai put any conflict behind them and join hands to form a new government. A cutthroat ideological showdown will resume but at least the overall situation will be straightforward.
This scenario is based mainly on an assumption that Pheu Thai and the People’s Party will emerge from the next election big enough to have majority control of the House of Representatives. In 2023, they did, winning altogether just short of 300 seats. Many analysts think their 2023 numbers can never be achieved by both parties again.
The two parties’ failures to win a combined parliamentary majority will give smaller parties great leverages. And if Bhumjaithai is substantially big, it will look very magnetically sexy. Anutin’s party won over 70 seats last time, and is widely expected to better that in the next election.
It could be a triangle again with any group among Bhumjaithai, Pheu Thai and the People’s Party being the decisive factor. Anyone of them can even make the highest demand _ for the prime minister post to be exact.
