The second term of a Donald Trump presidency would heighten tensions across key hotspots in Southeast Asia, as his administration would likely intensify efforts to counter and contain its chief rival, China, analysts predicted.
Judging by Trump’s previous term from 2017-2021, the US president might not pay much attention to the region, but his strategy and policies against China’s rising geopolitical influence would have serious implications for Southeast Asia, according to Chulalongkorn University Prof Ukrist Pathmanand.
Strategic locations where Chinese influence has loomed large could be identified as hot spots, including the Taiwan Straits, the contentious South China Sea, and Myanmar, he said.
The second Trump administration would be more assertive, as he had secured a convincing victory besides seizing control of Congress, Ukrist said.
Trump won 312 electoral votes and 74.6 million popular votes. The Republicans dominate both the Senate and the House, he said, “meaning Trump’s power is hard to contain”.
“Trump is likely to support Taiwan in multiple ways simultaneously, such as pressuring Taiwan to increase its military budget and selling advanced weapons not solely for defense and deterrence,” Ukrist told Thai PBS World.
Dulyapak Preecharush, the deputy director of Thammasat University’s East Asian Studies Institute, shared a similar view, saying the “Free and Open” Indo-Pacific strategy, which was clarified in geopolitical terms during Trump’s first term, would likely be further developed to become an even more potent force to counter China.
“This would be both a critical link with the Taiwan Strait and as a potential missile launch base that could reach certain provinces in China,” Dulyapak told Thai PBS World in an interview.
More tensions in the South China Sea
The Philippines and the South China Sea would gain greater strategic importance in a second Trump administration, according to Dulyapak.
The focus on the Philippines would, therefore, not only strengthen the US strategic foothold near China but also reinforce American influence in the South China Sea, applying pressure on Beijing and affecting the regional balance of power, he said.
Conflicting claims in the South China Sea have been at the core of territorial conflict among riparian states for a long time. Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei all claim sovereignty over parts of the sea, which are rejected by China.
There has been increasing militarization over the past years with the countries constructing facilities on many isles that can be used for military purposes.
While the US is not a claimant, Washington has promoted the idea of “Freedom of Navigation Operations”, ostensibly aimed at countering China's military presence.
Ukrist believes that the Trump presidency could sustain or even intensify these operations, targeting China’s territorial claims and reassuring allies such as the Philippines.
Trump might leverage American forces stationed at military bases in the Philippines to challenge and counter Chinese military maneuvers in the disputed waters, he added.
“The South China Sea could immediately become a hotbed of confrontation, with naval encounters between the Philippines and China already happening more frequently,” Ukrist predicted.
Less attention to Myanmar crisis
While the ongoing crisis in Myanmar might be important to Southeast Asia, it would not receive much attention from the Trump administration as the US has less strategic interest in the strife-torn country, according to a senior diplomat.
In terms of setting priorities for global strategic areas, Myanmar is not as important to the United States when compared to Israel, Ukraine, and the Korean peninsula, according to Dulyapak. “Therefore, it is likely that the US may not take an intensely active role in addressing the Myanmar crisis.”
However, if Trump decides to confront China more directly in Myanmar, there could be a noticeable increase in US involvement in the country. This shift would likely be aimed at countering Beijing’s influence in the region rather than on resolving Myanmar’s internal crisis, he said.
China might see the return of Trump differently as Beijing believes the National Unity Government (NUG) and certain ethnic armed groups in Myanmar are increasingly aligning their interests with the US.
One advantage for the US is its status as a role model in federalism and democracy, which resonates with the aspirations of the NUG and various ethnic groups and aligns with the core goals of Myanmar's peace process — an advantage China lacks.
Consequently, China has shifted to support the State Administration Council junta to a greater extent, partly to safeguard its own geopolitical interests, according to Dulyapak.
“If the Myanmar issue escalates into a significant geopolitical crisis, Trump might take an interest and aim to contain China’s influence in Myanmar,” he said.
A challenge for Thailand
If Trump intensifies his efforts to compete with China, it could inevitably affect Thailand’s security interests and require the government under Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra to be well prepared.
There could be an arms race in strategic maritime areas, from the Taiwan Strait to the Philippines and the South China Sea, potentially even extending into the Gulf of Thailand, Dulyapak said.
China has reportedly helped Cambodia develop military facilities at the Ream naval base in the Gulf of Thailand, which has caught the attention of the US.
This would likely influence Thailand’s stance within ASEAN, as well as disrupt trade and supply chains if certain coastal areas face blockades, he said. “Such tensions could strain regional stability and affect Thailand's maritime and economic interests.”
Thailand’s foreign and defense policies could find themselves at a critical crossroads, caught between balancing powers or potentially choosing sides — either aligning with China or the US, he said.
The increased rivalry may pressure Thailand to solidify its stance, which would have significant implications for its diplomatic relations, economic strategies, and military alignments within ASEAN and beyond, said Dulyapak, an expert on geopolitics and Myanmar.
Thailand's approach should involve preparing a flexible policy based on neutrality, meaning it should refrain from fully aligning with any side while selectively leaning towards either the US or China based on specific issues or contexts, he suggested.
For example, on matters of democracy and human rights, Thailand could lean towards the US, while on cross-border trade, it could align more with China, the scholar suggested. “However, Thailand should not only be flexible toward major powers; it should also emphasize its strategic vision.”
Thailand could assert itself as both a core and connector in geopolitical terms, highlighting its strategic location within both the Indo-Pacific framework and China's Belt and Road Initiative.
Positioned as a link between mainland and maritime ASEAN, Thailand could showcase its role in bridging different geopolitical spheres, Dulyapak said.
Ukrist wondered if the Paetongtarn government foresaw any changes and complexities after the return of Trump in its strategic and policy trajectory.
